| Logging into Labour » |
Fairweather friends?
Peter Riddell looks at the risk of recriminations between Darling and Brown as the economy falters
The pivotal relationship in any government is between a prime minister and chancellor. If it goes right, a government prospers. But if it goes wrong, then a government is almost certain to founder.
That is why reports of strains in relations between Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling matter. They threaten the cohesion, unity and direction of the fragile and already unpopular Brown government.
Darling is often misjudged and misunderstood. His quiet, patient and painstaking approach masks a highly intelligent and shrewd politician. It is easy to forget that he is one of the few survivors of the original Blair cabinet in May 1997 to have remained at the top ever since – the others being Brown himself and Jack Straw.
He is the quintessential man of office, with a reputation for quietly and calmly getting on with whatever he has been asked to do: whether, initially at the Treasury as chief secretary; then long spells at social security (now work and pensions) and transport (sorting out inherited messes), then at trade and industry, before becoming chancellor at the end of June 2007 when Brown became prime minister.
The chancellor is one of the prime minister’s long-established supporters. But he has always been an ally rather than an acolyte. He has never been one of those conspiratorial Brownites who have seen no fault in their leader.
He has always been able to detach himself and has recognised the flaws in Brown with a long-suffering good humour.
During the fraught, later Blair years, he was able to provide a link to the Blair camp, and was trusted by both. Without ambitions for the top himself, he has been content to support and advise Brown.
For Brown, Darling has been capable and competent, trusted to take forward welfare reform, sort out Network Rail and advance his competitiveness and productivity agenda.
But taking over from Brown as chancellor was bound to be difficult for both of them. Brown has always found it hard to delegate, especially to surrender control over a department upon which he had imposed himself so strongly for a decade. Moreover, Darling’s arrival coincided with the end of the largely benign economic decade of the Brown chancellorship. The sub-prime crisis in the US spread across the international banking system, then led to the run on Northern Rock.
There was also the inherited problem of the big changes in income tax, announced in March 2007, but taking effect a year later with the abolition of the 10p reduced rate band and the 2p reduction in the basic rate of income tax.
Darling did not have a free hand. First, he had to deal with regulatory failures by the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England, and then second-guessing by Brown and 10 Downing Street over the long-term future of Northern Rock.
Brown was reluctant to accept nationalisation for fear it would lead to charges of Labour reverting to its bad old ways. So the Treasury blames Number 10 for delaying the inevitable decision to take the bank over.
Second, Darling was aware from when he took over as chancellor that there were many losers – more than five million according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies – from the tax changes. But Brown brushed aside these worries, believing his treasured tax credit system would look after the losers.
So no action was taken in either the pre-Budget report or the Budget and it was only when normally loyalist Labour MPs threatened to revolt, and the party suffered big losses in the May local elections, that Darling came up with a £2.7bn compensation package. However, this benefited all taxpayers and not just the immediate losers.
The net effect of these episodes was to diminish Darling’s authority. He was not seen as his own man at the Treasury. His reputation with business was severely damaged by the pre-Budget report, when, in response to Conservative proposals on inheritance tax and the taxation of non-domiciles, he produced his own changes along with a major overhaul of the capital gains tax regime.
By the summer, there were repeated reports of strains between 10 Downing Street and the Treasury about how to respond to the economic slowdown – over a recovery package to help revive the housing market, notably any relief on stamp duty, and to alleviate the problem of rising fuel prices.
Brown and Darling remained publicly loyal to each other, but like so many prime ministers and chancellors before them, their relationship was not what it had been. Author: Peter Riddell
Peter Riddell is chief political commentator of the Times
This article first appeared in the Labour Party conference edition of the House Magazine
Trackback address for this post
Trackback URL (right click and copy shortcut/link location)
No comments yet
Leave a comment
About our blogs
Experts write for ePolitix.com on the key public policy issues.
For more information on writing for us, please email blogs@ePolitix.com.
Please read our guidelines on acceptable posts and comments.

