The Sunday Times
31 October 2004
In February 2003 Gordon Brown feared that Tony Blair was planning a quick war against Iraq to be followed by a cabinet reshuffle, in which the chancellor would lose his job. Evidently by the end of 2002 relations between 10 and 11 Downing Street were bad, with Brown "sick of fighting against bad decisions" and resentful that the prime minister no longer listened to him.
Those are the most striking revelations in Clare Short's book, although they do not come as a shock. Of course, in the event Brown was not sacked, so it may tell us more about the chancellor's suspicious mind than about any clearly formulated resolve on Blair's part to be rid of his troublesome colleague. Short also provides further evidence that Blair offered to make way for Brown to be prime minister in Labour's third term, an offer apparently dependent on receiving more support from the chancellor for taking Britain into the euro. For some reason Blair sent that message not directly to his neighbour in Downing Street, but via Short.
Sometimes unpopular ministers redeem themselves with a principled resignation.
Robin Cook is a good example. Short had the opposite experience. As the international development secretary she was liked for being feisty and plain-speaking. Nobody doubted the sincerity of her commitment to social justice.
But she made a mess of quitting, and it destroyed her credibility. Perhaps this book is her attempt at rehabilitation.
She states her case well, explaining why, as the Iraq war began, she felt compelled to stay because she would be needed for the reconstruction phase.
However, believing yourself to be indispensable smacks of hubris. She feels deceived by Blair, who promised that after the war Britain would work to put the United Nations in charge. But, as the book makes clear, she had already amassed countless examples of the prime minister's broken promises. "He does not seem to believe that the word of a prime minister is a very special, almost sacred thing.
He does not ... worry ... if (his promises) mislead." Then she, of all people, should not have allowed herself to be taken in.
Short breathes new life into the argument about whether the Iraq war was legal. On March 17, 2003 the attorney-general, Lord Goldsmith, told the cabinet that it would be, but his written opinion was not made available nor was the record of a meeting between him and Blair. With the publication a year later of the Butler Report on the use of intelligence, it became known that the attorney-general had written a few days before that to cabinet to ask whether "it is unequivocally the prime minister's view that Iraq has committed further material breaches ... of Resolution 1441".
According to Short the cabinet did not know that Goldsmith's opinion was based on a statement from Blair "that there was no other way of securing compliance". At that time Hans Blix, leading the weapons' inspectors, was reporting improved co-operation from Saddam, and missiles had been destroyed. Short concludes that "it is impossible to accept that the prime minister was correct, and it is clear therefore the legal authority for war was obtained on a false prospectus". It seems that this agile government had found a way for the attorney-general to satisfy himself on the issue. Of course war can be justified if there is no other option, and he chose the prime minister to be the arbiter on that crucial question.
Short is also firmly of the view that it was Blair and his entourage, not the intelligence services, that exaggerated the immediacy and intensity of the threat from Iraq. She is also incensed that Blair misrepresented President Chirac's television broadcast of March 10, 2003. The British seized upon it as proof that the French would never accept issuing Iraq with an ultimatum, so that any UN resolution was doomed to be vetoed by France. In fact, Chirac told his French audience that if the inspectors reported that Iraq was not co-operating "of course, regrettably, war would become inevitable".
The book aims to demonstrate that the handling of the Iraq crisis stems from the nature of new Labour and from the way that Blair had already chosen to do government business. "Neither Blair nor new Labour had any significant guiding principles, philosophy or values," she writes. "I cannot emphasise strongly enough how Tony Blair's highly personalised system of decision-making (explains) the lack of properly considered policy and thus the disaster in Iraq." She paints a picture, from the government's earliest days, of decisions taken by a small coterie around Blair, often excluding ministers completely.
Interestingly, she observes that Blair feels justified in centralising power to himself because he believes in his extraordinary personal achievement in winning two landslide election victories. Short argues that Labour was already headed for a big win while John Smith was still alive. She also analyses the votes in post-war elections. In 2001 Labour received fewer votes than in any except 1983 and 1987. Thus, fewer people voted for Blair than for Attlee, Gaitskell, Callaghan and Wilson (even in the elections that they lost), and Kinnock in 1992.
Some of the details of Blair's egoism are stunning. She comments that he "always has to behave and talk as though he knows more than anyone else on any subject", which she attributes to a form of insecurity. It is a condition that debars him from drawing on the knowledge and experience of those who know more. She also accuses him of a reckless lack of attention to detail. Those are not reassuring qualities in a leader.
In a long autobiographical preamble Short emerges as a genuine person, passionate about political causes. Certainly, she has an axe to grind, and a battered reputation to rebuild, and so like most political memoirs this one is one sided.
But it is well written, and offers a disturbing insight into a government where Blair seems to take every decision, not just about war, on the basis of poor information and without consultation. This work takes its place on the shelf alongside all the many volumes written by disillusioned ministers who served in previous Labour governments which also disappointed the party's idealists.
The book draws heavily on Short's diaries and speeches, which adds to its authenticity but not necessarily to the flow. On March 30, 2003, Short wrote in her diary: "I regret TB doesn't like detail. He likes the stage, the charm and PR rather than detail and truth. Not a bad person -this is the man."
Not a bad summary.
Available at the Sunday Times Books First price of £12 plus £2.25 p&p on 0870 165 8585
Read on...websites:
epolitix.com/clare-short Short's efficient homepage
books: Blair's Wars by John Kampfner (Free Press £7.99)
The road to Iraq
