NATO has reached an historic turning point, argues Daniel Forman

Redundant or resurgent? That is the key question hanging over NATO as the Western world's foreign policy focus shifts from the battle against communism to the war on terror. Can the alliance change or should it be pensioned off with an honourable discharge?

NATO's experiences in Afghanistan suggest it is not best suited to nation building, and internal splits meant it could not act in Iraq at all. In the Balkans it did, belatedly, carve out a successful role as Europe's policeman. But should a supposedly defensive organisation be operating "out of area" at all? Or should it recognise that NATO is now just one vehicle by which the West - for which it is possible to read the White House - can deliver geopolitical aims.

These are the questions going to the heart of what NATO is and should be. They are also the issues its leaders were grappling with at their summer summit. And at the centre of the debate is the alliance's new secretary general, Dutchman Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who has clear views of his own.

The NATO chief, who took on the job in January, has a large task on his hands. High in his in-tray is the 6,500-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is approaching its first anniversary in Kabul.

The operation has been hit by a lack of resources and slow decision making. Equipment shortages have forced plans for regional forces to be postponed. Meanwhile Iraq has taken international attention away from attempts to put the new Afghan government on its feet following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Labour MP Eric Ilsley returned from a recent visit to say: "Afghanistan is a basket case. It's a forgotten country."

But de Hoop Scheffer says Afghanistan is instead a good argument for both NATO's new 21st century role and the need for internal reform. However he believes that the time it takes from a decision on deployment to action being taken is too long. Therefore countries should be quicker at identifying resources, with some forces set aside for rapid reaction. There is a danger though that this approach could impinge on individual decisions on deployment being taken within NATO, with some smaller states not wanting to be forced into commitments.

The Istanbul summit of NATO leaders last month was taking on a four-pronged strategy for reform. NATO's presence in Afghanistan will be beefed up, allowing the alliance to support upcoming elections. In contrast, its security role in Bosnia will be wound up entirely by the end of the year. International partnerships will also be progressed, with north Africa the next focus for cooperation following the expansion eastwards to the Baltic states. And the military transformation programme will be implemented with rapid response and counter-terrorism operations to the fore.

Designated NATO forces will be prepared for short-notice call ups once the political go-ahead has been given. And a more flexible funding system could mean members paying for deployments without actually providing troops, rather than doing both or neither as is currently required.

But will the changes answer the fundamental questions about NATO's role in the post-September 11 world? They certainly push the alliance from its cold war "all for one and one for all" stance towards becoming a much looser confederation with opt in and opt out alternatives.

Counter terrorism, in terms of homeland security, is very much in NATO's traditionally defensive remit. But pre-emptive strikes, as witnessed in Iraq, are much more of a grey area. The difficulties in reaching consensus, decisions which involve contentious politics and intelligence, makes a NATO role in this area much trickier.

Hovering above all these issues is the question of Washington's attitude towards NATO. Since September 11 the Republican White House has been content to act with or without it. With his coalition of the willing approach George W Bush has been happy to use NATO when politically possible, such as the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. But equally he has been unconcerned at a lack of international support over the invasion of Iraq.

In contrast, Bill Clinton's Democratic administration was almost afraid to sneeze militarily without NATO or United Nations backing. In that context there was little question of NATO losing its place in the world. But a unilateralist US poses a different problem. If the need to tackle terrorism has made superpower America unafraid to act alone why have a NATO at all? When alliance members are willing to join they will, and when they are not they won't.

The result of November's presidential election could therefore be crucial. Democrat candidate John Kerry is pledging to re-engage the US with the international community, rejecting a go-it-alone approach. A victory for him will make NATO central to international defence again. Unless the Iraq experience forces a rethink, a second term for Bush could see NATO needing to formalise the join-us-if-you-will approach further or risk being left with little function at all.

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