Paul Beaver examines whether European forces have the technological capability to work with their US counterparts

It’s written about a lot, talked about even more, but what does "inter-operability" really mean? The answer is to ask the question in context. That question should be: do European armed forces have the right capabilities to work with the USA? There is a supplementary of course: what does it mean for the future of NATO and other Western-led missions?

Before answering the questions, the context is important. There is only one Premier League military nation – the USA, and the British are bound to it through treaty and policy. There are then two first division nations - France and the UK itself. Italy, the Netherlands (on a good day), Australia and Germany are second division. Everyone else is Vauxhall Conference. So the UK armed forces need to be able to work with the big boys across the Atlantic and the best of the European allies.

That has partly answered the first question. It is widely held within the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters that we need to be able to work closer with the French and Germans, while maintaining the strong links with the USA. Kosovo, two wars in the Gulf, Afghanistan and a host of smaller operations and training missions have developed a trust between the US and UK that is simply not there with other nations, with the possible exception of Australia.

A senior general said recently that the Europeans create good structures and faultless staff papers, but they just don’t want to come out and fight. Another top officer, with the senior service this time, noted recently that the need to work closely with the US Navy meant buying some of their equipment off-the-shelf – something that might appeal to HM Treasury but is unlikely to go down well across Whitehall in the Ministry of Defence or round the corner in the Department for Trade and Industry. The balance is important here. If Britain buys everything from the Americans, it won’t get the best available and won’t be able to compete in the long run – that’s bad for jobs, political clout, exports and even the Treasury might object.

On the whole, the Europeans, including the British, do not have the right kit for the next generation of war fighting and even peace keeping. There are huge capability gaps in Europe. So many, in fact, that they were defined last year to reduce the numbers and make the problem more politically acceptable in the Council of Europe!

Let’s take two examples that help answer the first question posed. Of the NATO alliance’s 220 strong strategic transport fleet, just 11 aircraft are European and several of those are in deep maintenance in Dresden being refitted for joint air-refuelling and transport roles – and even so they won’t carry heavy equipment. Air-refuelling itself is another critical shortfall but, interestingly enough, the Americans are short too. In both Kosovo and last year’s war in Iraq, the US Marines Corps and US Navy relied for half their tanker support from the boys (and girls) at RAF Brize Norton. But the UK fleet is ageing fast, and the Treasury is being a little slow in approving the revolutionary PFI deal for the AirTanker offer of A330 tankers. This arrangement will not only give the UK the best in-fight refuelling capabilities available but will be a model for others and will help Europe stand on its own feet.

For strategic airlift, the Royal Air Force has four C-17s from the Americans – but they are leased. A400M, will, of course, change all that but the world-beating Airbus design has yet to take to the air; first deliveries are planned for 2009 (France), 2010 (Germany) and 2011 (UK).

Some European forces want to see role specialisation to fill the capabilities gap. In other words, the German, for example, would run the tanks, the French the missile defences and the UK provide the infantry. That simply won’t work for all practical purposes, though it probably has appeal to the Treasury and those who want to see a fully-fledged but impotent European army. The Dutch have started the process by combining their naval mines countermeasures facilities with the Belgians and by opting not to join A400M but paying the German Luftwaffe to transport them. That’s OK, but they are not first division players in the deployment league.

Europe does have the capabilities to work in coalition – with itself or with the Americans. But it lacks the applications and training – and there are too many national vested interests at present. You don’t need the same equipment to be compatible, just the same techniques, tactics and those all-important computer interfaces – but you do need political will. There are good signs, of course, including the St Malo agreement between the UK and France, or the deals on transport aircraft and minesweepers mentioned above.

But if we Europeans are going to war, we need be able to work together at the governmental level as well as in the alleys and back streets of Afghanistan and other trouble spots. That is a capability still not addressed.

So what does this mean? When the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps takes over in Iraq later this summer, as many predict though a formal announcement is awaited, it will have the British as the framework nation. In other words, the command and control will be by a professional fighting force and other nations will work within the framework, providing the skills that they can. It worked in Bosnia but the testing time will be Iraq where there is a real war going on.

Paul Beaver is a director of Westminster-based defence consultancy Ashbourne Beaver Associates Ltd

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