Jolyon Kimble assesses the impact closer defence cooperation could have on the development of a European foreign policy

Defining European defence and foreign policy (the two areas are closely related), is a frustrating task. It is difficult even to be certain that the concept exists outside the handful of acronyms and plethora of platitudes that embody the theory. Pinning down a broadly acceptable definition with any reasonable specificity, let alone establishing the prospects of the concept’s future, presents real challenges.

As with much in European affairs, words are often contradictory to actions, and motives at odds with expressions of unity. Any optimism about a European superpower, as Tony Blair once confidently prophesised in Warsaw, is difficult to sustain. Equally, any assumption that a Europe genuinely combining to project power is nonsense would be foolish.

While it is true that national interest often trumps unity at an elevated diplomatic level, it is also the case that there have been real achievements in coordinated military and peacekeeping action that cannot be ignored.

Leaving aside the difficulty of establishing a definitive classification of the subject, any analysis of European foreign policy has to be a loose study of often incoherent strands of international activity.

However, inconsistency doesn’t preclude drawing real conclusions about the future of European internationalism. There are still clear trends that point the way to how the policy will evolve.

On the positive side, Europe is gaining momentum. EU foreign ministers have agreed a more pro-active stance on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation, and have in recent months adopted tougher stances on Myanmar, Iran and Cuba. Last December leaders agreed a new defence deal on a civil/military planning cell.

Only five years after the birth of intra-European defence cooperation, announced by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac in St Malo, the EU launched its first military mission in Macedonia last summer. The EU has also conducted its first autonomous mission (ie. one without NATO involvement), sending 1800 troops to the Congo last July – its first military action outside of Europe.

There is plenty of scope for the expansion of autonomous action in the future. As academic Dov Lynch notes, an "arc of instability" surrounds the EU, stretching from Belarus, via the Caucasus and the Middle East, through to Morocco. The EU also has the option of helping Russia to stabilise Moldova.

The work of its force in the Congo suggests that the EU could be a presence in Africa. Although Britain and France have both been involved in combat on the continent in recent years, NATO as a whole has often shied away from ground action in Africa, particularly after US experiences in Somalia. Perhaps an EU force could prove its mettle there. However, as with everything, this idea isn’t universally popular. Ex-German defence minister Volker Ruehe was unimpressed with such ambitions, arguing that "the EU should not try to re-invent the Afrikakorps".

Statements like this hint at the incompatibility of European internationalist visions. Although there is clearly the potential for an expansion of European military capabilities, the reality of the European political situation mitigates against it. There may be frictions between “old" and "new” Europe over sovereignty and respective clout, but there are just as many between the "big three" themselves. Squabbling and point-scoring, and a lack of mutual understanding, are by far the biggest blocks on progress.

However, there is also the shadow of the Atlantic dimension. The divisions from the Iraq war may mean that the US is inclined to perceive any extension of European capability as an attempt to undermine NATO, despite Britain's assurances that it would do nothing to undermine the transatlantic alliance.

The Americans would love to delegate some peacekeeping responsibilities to European powers, however, and part of the US administration views the growth of European capabilities as a potential means to ensure that Americans do not have to shoulder such a large part of the defence burden. But they continue to suspect the French of holding ambitions to create a rival superpower on the European continent.

Such suspicions aren’t helped by invitation-only gatherings between "core Europe" nations, such as the recent convention between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, that by their exclusivity implicitly threaten a two-speed approach to building a powerbase. Decisions like that taken by the French and German governments last July to set up a joint school for their Tiger attack helicopter pilots and mechanics either represent real progress, or are an act of deliberate provocation, depending on your viewpoint.

Similarly, the Berlin-Plus agreement signed in Copenhagen in 2002 either gives the EU access to NATO assets to deploy as it wishes, or requires the EU to work with NATO as a submissive partner. Perception is all.

In the final analysis, there is scope for a real step change in the influence of European foreign policy. Genuine cooperation may spring from the fallout of the Iraq war, which is an episode that may be perceived as pivotal in European relations.

The ground rules of progress probably don’t matter as much as the collective will. But as long as the handbrake of unanimity, and a culture of caution, covers foreign and defence decisions, Europe may never realise its potential.

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