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The truth behind the Iraq War

2 April 2009

Mr. Graham Allen (Nottingham, North) (Lab): As Parliament and MPs are being kicked around by Government and the media at the moment, it is probably worth reminding ourselves of a time in the not-too-distant past when Parliament did get off its knees, did speak for people and did seek to hold the Government to account. The two largest rebellions ever within a governing party occurred six years ago but, despite them, Parliament decided to support President Bush's war in Iraq. The last of our troops are coming home now, so it is a good time to ask the following question: what is the profit from our victory?

Some 179 of the troops' comrades have died, as have 4,259 members of the US military and an estimated 99,500 Iraqi civilians; an extraordinary and irreplaceable diversion of focus and resources away from the real threat, al-Qaeda, has taken place—imagine what we could have done in Afghanistan to the nest of al-Qaeda had we deployed all those resources where terrorism was clearly a threat. A new home for terrorism has been created. I take second place to nobody in condemning the tyranny of Saddam Hussein—the only thing that can be said for him is that, as a result of his butchery and tyranny, his own people were so much in fear that they were not susceptible to the splinter groups of al-Qaeda and to terrorism. Even in the depths of fantasy peddled by some of the people around President Bush, there was never a proven or sustainable link to al-Qaeda. The 100,000 or so people killed in Iraq had families, and the dysfunction that has been created is the perfect breeding ground for generations of terrorists, who can take flight around the globe and make all of our lives more difficult.

We also lost the moral high ground as a civilisation. Whether it was because of what happened in Abu Ghraib or anywhere else, our right to speak, in any sense, as superior to any other culture disintegrated very rapidly—the right was forfeited. We also smashed the precious Arab-west coalition that had been developed in the previous Iraqi war, and the United Nations—perhaps our best hope for the future—was irrevocably weakened. It can no longer summon up armies or nations to rid people of tyrannies, wherever those may be.

That is the legacy and we all have to live with it. It must be said that not a single weapon of mass destruction—the pretext of going into Iraq—was ever found there. That is history, but it useful to learn some lessons from history. I, like a majority of the people in the Chamber today who were also here at that time, opposed the war and organised, in this place, against it. After the decision was made, I kept my counsel and ensured that our young troops, many of whom are from my constituency—I have met them in Basra and elsewhere—were not undermined.

As we approach the sixth anniversary, I feel that some of the story can be told. Much of it reflects the grossly unbalanced relationship that exists in this place between Parliament and the Government, and there are a number of lessons that I would like the House and all Members to learn from that period. Before I touch on that, it is worth recalling that the first vote on the issue in this House, which took place on Wednesday 26 February 2003, was on the motion that the case for war was "unproven", and 122 Labour MPs voted to oppose going to war. Had the Conservative MPs voted for the amendment, war would have been defeated by 109 votes. I am not making a partisan case. The Conservative Members who voted for the amendment did so with great courage and resilience, and those who did not voted in the way that they did because they felt, openly and honestly, that that was the best way to go.

The second such vote took place on 18 March 2003, on the amendment that the case for war had "not yet been established", and the majority of the non-payroll vote on the Labour side—139 Labour Members—voted to oppose going to war. Sometimes my friends in the Liberal Democrats inadvertently make it appear that only they opposed the war at the time. A significant number of Liberal Members voted with us on that amendment, but it was not as large as 139—the number of Labour MPs that voted to oppose going to war. Some 219 Members, from all parties, voted against going to war and another 29 deliberately abstained. Had the Opposition voted for the amendment, it would have been carried by 109 votes and Bush would have gone to war on his own.

Sir Robert Smith: There is a question as to whether Mr. Bush would have gone to war on his own or whether by supporting him we conferred legitimacy on his actions. One of the most frightening conversations I have had was with an academic in the US, during a Select Committee visit, who said, "I had a lot of qualms about the war, but when I saw Tony Blair was backing it, I decided it was all right for us to go to war."

Mr. Allen: Tempting as the hon. Gentleman's offer is, I shall not go over the old ground and reopen wounds within or across parties: I am trying to tease out some of the lessons for the future. I remember that he was in the Lobbies with us on those key occasions.

Had the Opposition not voted against, but abstained, we would have needed just 20 more colleagues to have blocked the war—so near, but so far away. Despite all the pressure, the hysteria, the whipping and the meetings with Cabinet Ministers and even the Prime Minister, the threats that the Prime Minister would resign and the accusations that people were siding with Saddam Hussein or were being unpatriotic, it is remarkable that those who opposed going to war not only maintained their opposition, but strengthened their position by the time of the second vote. That is a tribute to all those in all parties, of many different views, who felt so strongly that then was not the time to go to war.

I want to take the House on a brief stroll down parliamentary memory lane to recall the first rebel Parliament since the Long Parliament of 1640. The Long Parliament managed to fight the English civil war and execute the King. Its successor was not so dramatic, but it forced the Executive to convene the real Parliament to debate the slide into war against Iraq. In doing so, it opened up issues that are still pertinent to the House in general, and the possibility of a serious debate on the war in Iraq that would not pick over the bones of who was right or wrong, but would ensure that we learn the lessons and decide where the balance of authority should lie between Parliament and the Executive—something that we still need to resolve. When Parliament can check and scrutinise the Executive, we will have truly learned those lessons. The question is not when the Government will allow Parliament to scrutinise the Government. It is surely a complete contradiction in terms that the very body that will be scrutinised is the body that allows that scrutiny to take place. It defies human nature to want such exposure. There has to be a separation so that Parliament can do its job properly and question any Government's decision at any time to go to war, and monitor the subsequent conduct of that war.

Through the summer recess of 2002, pressure was building up. The then Prime Minister was scuttling over to Camp David regularly, and it looked very much as though the United States would attack Iraq, and that Britain would be involved by virtue of the "special relationship" between Tony Blair and President Bush. They gave a press conference on 3 September 2002. Tony Blair said that if the situation developed in Iraq then the "fullest possible debate will take place, not just in the country but obviously in Parliament and elsewhere".

The term "elsewhere" was unfortunately characteristic: Parliament had no higher status in the prime ministerial mind than the media, the pub, the opinion polls or the focus groups. As events would prove, Parliament was not genuinely and openly involved in the process. Instead, Members had to fight to stake a claim to represent legitimately the opinions that they were hearing in their constituencies. That right was not gifted to us by Parliament, nor was it ours as of right. It had to be fought for, as indeed have almost all extensions of our rights.

Parliament had no rights either to recall itself or to debate war powers, and the Government gave no sign that they intended to recall Parliament before 15 October even though it was clear that they were likely to take this country to war. Many hon. Members at the time thought that that would be far too late and the die would be cast. On 3 and 4 September, I wrote to the Prime Minister asking him to consider recalling Parliament, and I know that dozens of other colleagues did the same—we agreed that this would be a good thing to do—but Tony Blair has never revealed how many MPs requested a recall.

We believed that a recall of Parliament would strengthen British policy and diplomacy; would strengthen the Prime Minister's negotiating capability with the US President; and would help to explain the issues to the country, which was deeply divided and anxious about the possibility of war. Above all, recalling the forum of the nation would allow the ventilation of the views that had been expressed to us in July, August and September. That should always be our primary role, but it cannot be our role if we cannot meet to express those views.

Apart from writing to the Prime Minister, there is nothing else that an MP can do to get Parliament recalled. The Standing Order on the recall of Parliament—Standing Order No. 13—says that once the House is adjourned, a recall can only be achieved by representations "to the Speaker by Her Majesty's Ministers that the public interest requires that the House should meet".

The Prime Minister has monopoly power over the recall of Parliament: the very person Parliament is meant to scrutinise is the only person who can authorise that scrutiny.

Since then, I have placed on the Order Paper every day a modest change to the right of this House to recall itself—to enable Mr. Speaker, without a request from Ministers, to think carefully about whether, on rare occasions, the House should be recalled. Regardless of people's views about whether we should have gone to war at that time and about the timetable set by the President, all parliamentarians would surely have wanted the Speaker to make the decision about recall.

In spite of growing pressure from MPs, the Prime Minister was not willing to recall Parliament. Several of us therefore began to contemplate the idea of a rebel, unofficial Parliament—an alternative assembly of MPs. If Parliament was to be vetoed, perhaps MPs could take the initiative and convene themselves, meeting as an assembly of MPs outside of Executive control. Imagine that. Although it would clearly be second best to a real Parliament, the assembly could debate Iraq under strict parliamentary rules and put constituents' views on the record. Having spoken to a number of colleagues in all parties, I wrote to every Member of the House and asked three questions: first, would they support Parliament's being recalled to discuss the Iraq issue; secondly, if Parliament was not officially recalled, would they consider attending a gathering elsewhere of MPs operating under strict parliamentary rules to discuss the Iraq issue; and thirdly, would they support a change in the Standing Orders to enable the Speaker to recall Parliament without the qualification that it should be at the request of Ministers if the Speaker were satisfied that the public interest did so require? The response was overwhelming. No fewer than 85 per cent. of Back Benchers agreed the need for an official recall, 65 per cent. agreed to come to an unofficial recall and 86 per cent. agreed that the Standing Orders should be changed, although, by agreement with my party's Whips, I did not release those figures to the media. It was clear that the demand was there for an alternative Parliament.

On 5 September, I invited the former Speaker, Lord Weatherill, to resume his role for one day in the alternative Parliament. I also asked the then Serjeant at Arms if it was possible to hire the Chamber of this House. On 7 September, Lord Weatherill accepted the invitation to chair the alternative Parliament, which gave an immense boost to its standing. I looked for a team of Deputy Speakers and retired Clerks to support him.

We also began to think about procedures. An alternative Parliament did not need to be bound by obsolete and inefficient traditions. We planned to try out innovations, including a microphone for every Member, working sensible hours and a strict limit of 10 minutes on all speeches, with no privileges for Front Benchers or Privy Counsellors. Our Speaker would let the House sit until MPs had spoken. For once, a late-night sitting would be justifiable. We wanted to allow MPs who could not be on hand at the alternative Parliament to hand in their speech for the record, as is done in the US Congress.

We planned a live webcast of the alternative Parliament on the internet so that any elector could e-mail their views as they watched the debate. We even thought of a new logo—a raised portcullis, representing letting people into their Parliament rather than shutting them out. On Monday 9 September, a Back-Bench steering group of one MP from each party was created to oversee those arrangements.

The following day we had a classic Catch-22 response from the Serjeant at Arms: he could not allow the Chamber to be used until the House agreed, but the House would not reconvene until 15 October. We looked for an alternative venue in Westminster and settled on Church House—a chamber used when Parliament was bombed in the second world war. To many MPs, that circular 600-seat chamber was actually better designed than the Commons Chamber. I was told that it would cost £6,000 for a day and fortunately my wallet was spared by offers of financial support from the BBC, the Daily Mirror, the Rowntree trust and several individuals. We settled on the date of Thursday 19 September for the first Parliament to recall itself.

Invitations, as many colleagues will recall, were sent to every MP and it became clear on 10 September that there would be overwhelming attendance—we had gained a critical mass of Members of Parliament who were willing to attend to put their very different points of view at that gathering. We were also gathering massive coverage in the media, and the clincher was a call from the BBC to ask whether it could cover the debate from gavel to gavel, from morning until it finished. I, along with my colleagues who were involved at that point, readily agreed to that request.

On Wednesday 11 September—the anniversary of 9/11 —No. 10 capitulated. Robin Cook called me to concede that the official Parliament would be recalled, and so there would be no need for an alternative Parliament. Characteristically, No. 10 briefed the media before it briefed the steering group of MPs, but we were none the less delighted to have made the Executive recall Parliament, even though they were opposed to doing so.

The alternative Parliament secured for Parliament the right to debate the Government's conduct of policy towards Iraq. That would not have happened for a further month had we not taken those steps. History will judge whether Parliament made the best use of that opportunity and whether it did enough to probe the military, political, legal and moral case for the Iraq war, or to expose the half-truths and outright falsehoods that accompanied it, as well as the lack of preparation for the aftermath—the absolutely criminal lack of preparation for victory, which meant that military victory was obtained but the peace was lost and frittered away.

Perhaps the subject of how the votes were organised and how the opinions fell is one for another day. However, many colleagues felt that that was the first e-mail rebellion in the House of Commons. The virtual organisation that was set up to support colleagues from all parties worked very well. The names of the colleagues who were involved and who stood out on that occasion are evident for all to see in the Division lists, which are still available.

Six years later, we still have unfinished business from the alternative Parliament, from those votes and from the decisions that were taken at that point. The recall of Parliament is still in the gift of the Executive. I still hope that all Front Benchers will seek to persuade their parties to commit to changing that. In spite of promises, Parliament still has no rights to approve war-making and the conduct of wars. The Prime Minister can still send our forces to war in the name of the Crown, as though he were Henry V at Agincourt. As we discovered in the run-up to the war, Parliament still receives no independent legal advice on the legality of war and still depends on the good will of the Law Officers even to see a brief outline of their opinion, let alone to debate it. This House needs its own legal capacity so that Members can refer to a Law Officer of their own to be sure of their legal standing when they make decisions that could come before the International Criminal Court and, in the most extreme cases, could result in charges when laws have been passed illegally because of the votes of Members. We need that capacity and we do not have it. Parliament still has no means of examining the quality and reliability of intelligence information if it is used to justify the resort to war.

Although those issues remain unresolved, hon. Members should look back at those votes and at the genuine opinions that were expressed in all parts of the House, and should take heart from the fact that this Parliament can get off its knees and express a view on behalf of the people out there. Members of Parliament do not have to be whipping boys of the media for the sins of one or two of our colleagues. We can have our rights, we can exercise our responsibilities and we can hold Governments to account. Even though—amazingly—it is now six years since those exciting and in many ways tragic days of 2003, I hope that Members of all parties, including those who will or do form Governments, will learn some of those lessons and implement some of the changes to make this House, once again, worthy of the name of the Parliament of the British people.