The Live Wire

A bigger bite of business

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By Meg Russell
- 19th February 2010

This week and next the Commons debates the proposals of the Wright committee – the select committee on reform of the House of Commons, chaired by Tony Wright. One of its central recommendations is that decisions about use of time in the chamber are opened up, with greater responsibility being handed to MPs. This would be exercised through two new committees representative of the chamber as a whole – a backbench business committee and a House business committee – in place of the ‘usual channels’. If agreed, how would these arrangements work in practice, and how much difference would they really make?

The first observation is that there is a crucial difference between the proposal for a backbench business committee and the proposal for a House business committee. The two committees would have separate responsibilities, and their effects could be quite different. Members will no doubt wonder why the proposal is to create two new ‘business’ committees, rather than just one. But the thinking of the Wright committee in making this proposal is clear, and very important.

It hinges on the need to distinguish between time spent in the chamber on ‘government’ or ‘ministerial’ business, and time spent on other matters more properly considered ‘backbench’ business. Government business most obviously includes government bills. Backbench business includes more clearly parliamentary matters where the government has less direct interest, such as debating select committee reports, holding topical or general debates, and discussing procedural changes.

At present no distinction is made between these different kinds of business, and all is scheduled by the usual channels. That puts the government chief whip and leader of the House in the lead. It seems particularly inappropriate for ministers to be making decisions on backbench business: such as whether a select committee report is debated or which topical debates should be held. Indeed, given that Opposition Days are separately guaranteed, there is no need for frontbenchers to be involved in this at all. Hence the Wright committee proposes handing scheduling of backbench business to a representative committee entirely made up of backbenchers, elected by the chamber.

Backbench business would be guaranteed approximately one day per week, on top of existing time for private member’s bills and adjournment debates.

The backbench business committee would decide how to make best use of this relatively limited time, taking into account backbench and public demand. Ministers would lose some discretion, but would benefit through no longer being blamed for withholding time. This arrangement would be more transparent, would make the chamber more responsive and topical, and should reduce existing frustrations amongst MPs.

The trickier question relates to the scheduling of government business. Here ministers clearly have an interest, and it is reasonable for the government to expect to get its legislation debated in good time. The Wright committee could have recommended giving this responsibility to the backbench business committee as well, but this would have been unrealistic. Ministers would refuse to give up all control over the timing of their legislation, and opposition frontbenchers wouldn’t trust this to backbenchers either. The Wright committee’s decision to separate these two matters is therefore a pragmatic and sensible one.

But the UK Parliament is unusual, certainly in European terms, in having an informal ‘usual channels’ arrangement to decide such matters rather than a more formalised procedure. Most other parliaments give this responsibility to some sort of cross-party business committee. But two things must be noted about such committees. First, they are dominated by frontbenchers or whips, often with no backbench representation. And second, the real business frequently takes place outside the meeting, through informal soundings not unlike our usual channels. The meeting itself then just approves the result of these discussions. It is important, therefore, not to romanticise such arrangements. In particular, handing responsibility for backbench business to such a committee could simply leave it subject to the same shadowy deals that go on now.

Hence the Wright committee proposes that there should be a House business committee with overall responsibility for scheduling business, including government business. This would comprise the members of the backbench business committee, sitting alongside representatives of the three front benches. This wider group could not overturn decisions already taken about backbench business. Neither could it overturn frontbench proposals for government business, but backbenchers would at least gain some input. In practice, as happens elsewhere, much of the real negotiation might go on outside the meeting. But at least there would be some consultation, and greater transparency.

Perhaps more importantly, the Wright committee proposes that the House business committee’s weekly business programme should be put to the House itself for approval: a model that currently operates in the Scottish Parliament. Hence if the government simply ignored reasonable objections, and these were supported by a majority of the House, its programme could be forcibly amended. Again, this would broaden ownership of difficult decisions about how to use parliamentary time. In proposing changes Members themselves would be forced to confront the trade-offs between time spent on one bill and another. Government could not block debate on controversial aspects of a bill that most Members strongly wanted debated. But of course debating time is limited, and the system would need to prevent everything being endlessly delayed. The end result might therefore be some changes at the margins, but no fundamental alteration to the balance of how time is spent – unless of course government chose to publish fewer bills. But the system would be more transparent and democratic.

All party leaders have indicated support for the backbench business committee proposal, but there is more resistance, most obviously from government, to moving to a House business committee. On Monday February 22 the first of these may therefore be agreed in principle, but the second will be the source of argument on March 4. The House business committee is clearly seen by Members as the bigger prize, and a weekly vote on the future business would potentially make a real difference. But the backbench business committee, if properly implemented, could be at least as important to the way the future House of Commons runs.

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