



## **Unite Submission to the Department of Transport “Reforming Rail Franchising” Consultation**

### **1 Introduction**

- 1.1. Unite is the UK’s largest trade union with almost 1.5 million members across the private and public sectors. The union’s members work in a range of industries including manufacturing, financial services, print, media, construction, transport, local government, food, agriculture, education, health, not for profit. Of particular relevance to this submission, Unite has membership in train manufacturing, supply chain companies, train operating companies, maintenance depots, repair workshops and infrastructure companies.
- 1.2. Unite believes that the rail network in the UK provides the capacity to significantly reduce transport emissions if correctly managed and developed. Equally it also provides the opportunity to create more delays, passenger and freight user dismay and significant disquiet if mismanaged. Given rails important role, Unite believes that whilst the network may be best served if it was renationalised this is unlikely to happen and the next best option would be the introduction of longer franchises to inject a level of stability that has been lacking.

### **2 Executive summary**

- 2.1. The benefits of a longer franchise are considerable. Why would a short term franchise holder invest in the education of staff through an apprenticeship scheme if they realise the beneficiaries of such may well be a rival operator who takes on the apprentice once they have completed their training? Equally why should an operator invest in new rolling stock and the long term maintenance of existing stock if it will only be handed over at the end of their tenure? Clearly there are no such benefits, which is why current investment levels are inconsistent throughout the franchise duration.
- 2.2. For the rail network to be fit for purpose in to the next century it requires investment both in terms of infrastructure and of employees qualified to staff and maintain it. The current cycle of initial investment, which diminishes rapidly as the end of the franchise approaches is unlikely to end, however. Longer franchises enable these holders time to realise the benefits of investing.

- 2.3. The current rail network has not got the long term capacity to deliver what is to be required of it to meet customer demands particularly during rush hour periods. Due to the limitations on the network in terms of potential capacity any potential long term franchise holder should be required to invest heavily in infrastructural improvements and not leave this burden on the tax payer or its customers.
- 2.4. The environmental advantages of rail over the private car and other options should not be forgotten when designing a franchise system for the future. It is of little advantage to have the most efficient service possible if the masses cannot afford to use it. Amending the cap on tickets to allow a 3% above RPI increase in fares at a time when many workers face additional financial burdens and below cost of living salary increases will force commuters away from large industrial centres or increase congestion on the road. This can only damage any financial recovery from the recession.
- 2.5. Despite its failings, there is a clear requirement for Network Rail or some other body to centralise the management of the rail network. Passing such a responsibility to the franchise holders (as has been suggested by some commentators and groups) would cause major problems for the rail freight industry and other rail users.

### **3 Ownership of the network**

- 3.1. In an ideal world Unite is of the belief that the rail network should be renationalised and run by central government as a national asset. We are realistic, however, and realise that under the current administration such a move would be highly unlikely.
- 3.2. If it is the intention of the government of the day, to keep the day to day operation of the network in its current format, there needs to be very tight limitations on the way in which these franchises operate. This will prevent excessive profiteering from what in most cases is a quasi monopolistic service.
- 3.3. In the past we have seen too many franchisees milk the taxpayer and the travelling public for revenue, only for this money to end up in the pockets of shareholders and highly paid executives. The idea that millionaire Sir Richard Branson and Brian Souter, for example, receiving rail subsidies of £250 million a year, from the taxpayer for running the busiest and most expensive rail line in Europe, is clearly wrong. Unite firmly believes, that stringent financial regulation of franchisees and of Network Rail is needed to ensure that the ratio between the highest paid executive and the lowest paid employee is no more than 10:1 and that shareholders dividends are not paid for by the taxpayer.

### **4 Capacity requires investment**

- 4.1. The rail network requires there to be a seamless carriage of passengers and freight from A to B in a method which can attract the consumer away from

the use of alternative means of travel. Whilst praising the virtues of rail travel in that it provides the individual with a place to relax and not battle through our congested roads, the rail network is fast approaching capacity itself.

- 4.2. The consultation notes that in a recent passenger survey one of the key complaints was the availability and quality of on board toilet facilities. On some routes at peak times the ability to get on to a train, let alone get a seat, or get to the toilet has become increasingly unlikely. With the population of the UK increasing by around 1000 people per day<sup>1</sup> currently (or the equivalent of the population of Manchester per year<sup>2</sup>) it is not surprising that there will be an increasing demand for an expansion of services.
- 4.3. The results of the National Travel Survey issued in July, suggest, however, that during 2009 there was a decline in demand<sup>3</sup>, which could be as a direct result of the economic downturn. 55 percent of respondents said they had travelled by train at least once in the previous year, however, an increase of 49 percent on 2006 results. 30 percent of all respondents had also made at least one long distance rail journey in the year, representing an increase from 25 percent in 2006.
- 4.4. Despite the apparent decline in overall demand, as illustrated by the table at Appendix 1, the number of trains running in excess of capacity has, in some cases increased. This clearly illustrates the regional differences that occur on some routes and the way in which the franchisees have managed demand and the way passengers have been priced off of trains. Predictions suggest that in the long to medium term, the whole network will not be able to cope with peak demand requirements<sup>4</sup>.
- 4.5. The results of the National Travel Survey suggest that people are either not travelling as much or have simply chosen a different method of travel. The rail passenger's experience is critical to attracting passengers away from the alternatives. If the price, convenience or journey quality is not there, the passenger will choose an alternative mode. Such a change will inevitably result in an increase in emissions and congestion.
- 4.6. The ability to increase current capacity is severely limited as the rail network was designed for steam powered locomotives and carriages from a Victorian era. Tunnels and bridges were built so that the minimum clearance was needed reducing the cost of over engineering the routes. As a result the routes cannot utilise double decked carriages that are utilised in continental Europe.
- 4.7. Platforms were designed to accommodate shorter trains as the engines were not powerful enough to move longer ones. Today's modern locomotive

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<sup>1</sup> Source:- <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=950>

<sup>2</sup> Source :- 2001 Census states that Manchester has a population of 394,269, the office of National statistics reported that the increase in the UK population between mid 2008 and mid 2009 was 394,000.

<sup>3</sup> The National Travel Survey reports that in 2009 there were 973 trips per person per annum travelling an average total of 6,775 miles. In 1995/97 the average person took 1,086 trips per annum covering a total of 6,981 miles.

<sup>4</sup> HS2 predictions suggest that there will be a 267% increase in rail demand on its route by 2033.

units have decentralised power units, which allows any length of train to be theoretically possible. Land take for the construction of residential and industrial properties, is often allowed to run to within a few feet of the track bed, however. Consequently, such developments prevent the utilisation of this additional train length, due to the need to extend the platform length, the requirement to provide additional station facilities and the number and size of access points.

- 4.8. Track beds have been laid 2.44m (8 feet known as W8) apart between centre lines, as the standard throughout the UK, to reduce land take when forging new routes or improving old ones. Today these track beds are being re-engineered so that they are lower and further apart to accommodate freight container traffic, which are 2.90m (9 feet 6") wide. Newer freight US style containers are even larger. Wherever feasible, therefore, tracks are being moved even further apart<sup>5</sup> and lowered to allow more clearance under bridges and through tunnels for this freight traffic.
- 4.9. The track bed improvement would enable the possibility for wider and slightly taller carriages to be utilised on the network, but so far, this option has not been pursued due to the resultant increased gap between platform edge and conventional passenger carriages<sup>6</sup>. Additionally platforms would have to be narrowed to allow such carriages to pull into the stations.
- 4.10. Unite believes that the provision of new and additional track is the simplest method of increasing capacity and resilience to disruption. Upgrading the West Coast Line, for example, could increase capacity by 50% but such an improvement is predicted to cost the nation £3.1 billion<sup>7</sup>.
- 4.11. Planning authorities have in the past not secured land needed for use by rail along key corridors. Land which had been previously set aside has been released for everything from housing developments to town bypass construction. As a result properties have been constructed so that they back directly on to the track bed and routes that may have had a future and which could have been closed may never now be returned to rail traffic use.
- 4.12. An example of this is the route between Stansted Airport and Braintree in Essex. The existing track bed was ripped up as a result of the Beeching report and the route utilised as the foundation for a bypass around Dunmow. This bypass has now been itself bypassed by the development of the new A120 dual carriageway route between Braintree and the airport and on to the M11. Had this track existed to this day, passengers wishing to access the airport from the mid, northern and eastern parts of Essex, the majority of Suffolk and the ports of Felixstowe and Harwich, would not have been forced onto a track which takes them into central London or via Ipswich and Cambridge. Passengers from these areas consequently tend to favour the use of private cars to access this airport<sup>8</sup>. The original road improvement is

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<sup>5</sup> Ideally to 3.04m (W10) or 3.66m (W12)

<sup>6</sup> up to 0.61m (2').

<sup>7</sup> HS2 report

<sup>8</sup> Around 25% of passengers travel to Stansted airport by rail and another 20% by bus or coach. The rest utilise the car. (source CAA)

a clear example of a short-term thinking promoting the car over the rail user, with no concept of the potential increase in demand which followed.

- 4.13. The final option is to increase capacity on the network, to increase the speed of the trains and reduce the safety margins between trains. This is the method currently being employed by most of the franchises. This not only allows the increase in train and carriage numbers it also reduces the duration of the passenger journey enabling a greater utilisation of the existing assets.
- 4.14. Decreasing the gaps between trains requires the operators to know precisely where trains are located. The current system can tell the control rooms that a train is located on a particular stretch of track but not where it is in its transit through that section. GPS location of train carriages may be possible in open terrain areas, but such a system would not work inside a tunnel or under bridges and given satellite signals can be deflected by rocky terrain, embankments and buildings, accurate receiving equipment would be required. Additionally, unless the train can communicate this information to its control room and receive back details of distances from other traffic, gaps needed to avoid collisions cannot be maintained.
- 4.15. Speeds cannot continue to be increased indefinitely, however, and any increase in speed creates a considerable increase in the wear on the tracks and energy needed to achieve these speeds. Additionally utilising the existing rolling stock at speeds beyond its original design specifications also increases the risk to the safety of the travelling public.
- 4.16. High school physics tells us that the kinetic energy increases with the square of the speed. This means, for example, that an object travelling twice as fast will have four times as much kinetic energy. As a result of this, a train travelling twice as fast requires four times as much distance to stop and wears the track and any overhead cabling four times as fast. Consequently, the cost of regular maintenance and repair also increases.
- 4.17. Modern high speed passenger trains get around this to a degree by decentralising the traction units throughout the length of the train, instead of having a powerful engine or engines at one end pulling or pushing a series of un-powered carriages. The decentralisation distributes weight of the engine throughout the train, enabling it to corner more efficiently.
- 4.18. Rail freight capacity cannot utilise the high speed option to increase capacity in the same way as passenger trains. Rail freight cars are generally un-powered units pushed and pulled by a single or multiple engines. Unlike passenger traffic, rail freight is not restricted by platform length, however. Increasing the maximum length of freight trains therefore eliminates the need for a gap between following freight trains and hence increases the efficiency of the network. The only downside to increasing freight train length is the amount of space such a unified train requires to pass through any area and the potential disruption that may be caused should their be a traction unit failure.
- 4.19. Although rail freight operators are not franchisees, provision needs to be made in any franchise, to allow the passage of freight within timetables. Not

all freight can travel at night when the majority of passengers are in their beds and on occasion this means running freight operations at peak times.

- 4.20. To modernise the network, any franchise holder should be required to contribute to the cost of upgrading and maintaining the line, line side equipment and the rolling stock which utilise it to a far greater extent. Additionally the franchise holder should ensure that there are sufficient gaps in their timetable to enable the predicted increase in demands for rail maintenance teams to access the track given the increased wear rates caused by faster running.
- 4.21. At a time of recession when government finances are tight, Unite understands that the level of investment needed to keep the network running will be difficult to find from central funds. Unite believes that this investment is becoming increasingly critical, however, and wide spread disruption is inevitable if these funds are not found.
- 4.22. Unite is firmly of the belief that franchise holders should make a fair contribution to the funds needed to maintain and rebuild the networks they will be utilising rather than relying on the taxpayer.
- 4.23. Diversification into additional services to improve the passenger experience and provide additional revenue should be explored. Onward travel information, updates on the progress of delays, and news bulletins could be provided free to encourage easy transit to other travel options at journeys end. Such services could be provided via digital advertising boards. On longer services, internet connectivity is already being made available, for example. The provision to provide onboard entertainment via seatback monitors or more competitively priced refreshments could also provide more revenue.
- 4.24. Many franchises claim they rely on central government funds to make a profit from the operation of the routes, claiming that services will be cut if they do not receive the funding. Unite would argue that if the services are provided, they should meet three key requirements:-
- Providing mass transport for commuters
  - Providing a late night and early morning service to enable the spread of a more flexible hours culture to prevail in industry
  - Providing a balanced off peak service throughout the day which removes services which are under utilised and appear to be only put on in order to improve punctuality statistics.

## **5 Apprentices and investment in the future needed**

- 5.1. With an aging population, the need for replacement staff and developments in technological advancement, the need for further education of new and existing staff is a must. While franchises are of a short duration, there is little or no incentive for the franchise operator to invest in its workforce or equipment if the ultimate beneficiary is its successor. Longer franchises increase the window of opportunity for the operators to realise the benefits of their investment. There are therefore, considerable benefits of longer franchises in this respect.

- 5.2. Unite and other bodies in the rail sector have invested in an engineering academy to assist in this process to combat any potential skill shortages in the future. It is ultimately down to the franchise operator to invest their resources and staff time in order to make proper use of these facilities.
- 5.3. The provision of longer franchises does not mean handing the franchise the licence to print money. Key targets should be set which specify punctuality and reliability minimum standards, as well as requiring investment in the people employed by the company.

## 6 **Ticket pricing should encourage a modal shift to rail not discourage it**

- 6.1. The move towards a principally electrically powered network could help improve the environmental credentials of the rail industry and considerably assist the government's carbon reduction aims, only if the investment is forthcoming to decarbonise electrical generation. If ticket pricing and over crowding is allowed to increase unchecked, it will make the use of the mode less attractive to the consumer than using the alternative methods available.
- 6.2. Despite efforts by government and some industries to encourage a more flexible working regime, the commuting peak still revolves around a 9 till 5 working day, causing congestion on both rail and road networks. At this peak period, commuters are held to ransom by the rail network providers over the amount they pay for the privilege of avoiding traffic jams. In turn employers, pay the price of increasing demands from their workforce for salary and weighting increases to meet these additional costs.
- 6.3. Outside of these periods, the use of the network changes rapidly to one utilised less by the world of work and more for leisure purposes and for the distribution of freight. As a result the price of a ticket should strike the balance between attracting consumers away from less polluting modes and making the profits necessary to make system viable financially.
- 6.4. Equally during peak periods capacity is stretched to its very limits and it is becoming increasingly rare to find seats for all. The exception to this being the school holiday periods when the majority of parents take their annual allocation of leave. Outside of these peaks, the access to the rail priority should shift to freight movements which would enable a greater transfer of long distance freight movements away from the road.
- 6.5. The National Travel Survey, suggests that the within the public at large the most popular reason people used the train, in the year was to visit friends or family.
- 6.6. Unite believes therefore that if a franchise is to be successful ticket pricing structure restrictions and rail access charge structures need to be rebalanced to discourage leisure use at peak without penalising commuters and in turn their employers. Equally access to the rail off peak priorities should be rebalanced in favour of freight without reducing passenger service frequency to a degree which would encourage modal shift away from the network.

- 6.7. Unite does not believe that the alteration of the cap on ticket prices allowing increases up to 3 percent above RPI would, therefore, be a solution. At a time when salaries are rising by an average of between 1.2<sup>9</sup> per cent and 2.1 percent<sup>10</sup> to see an increase of 6.9<sup>9</sup> per cent places an additional burden on commuters when government spending cuts and tax increases are already stifling consumer spending. Such a policy would see the annual fare rise by an additional 45 per cent between 2010 and 2015 pushing the cost of an annual season ticket from Oxford or Chelmsford to London from around £3,900 to £5,600 and from around £3, 400 to £4,900 from Reading<sup>11</sup>.
- 6.8. According to the latest RPI data for October 2010, rail fares are already increasing by 8.8 per cent last year alone. With the predicted rises in rail travel costs for commuters it will not be surprising if there is a significant increase in peak road congestion as current train passengers are forced back onto the road. Removal of the cap and limiting the cost of off peak travel simply empties the pockets of the consumer, stifling growth in other sectors.
- 6.9. Appendix 2 and 3 clearly illustrate that there is in excess of £6 billion total franchised passenger revenue raised each year from a market which although slowed by the recession shows a remarkable growth rate.

## 7 **Environmental adaptation is hampered**

- 7.1. A single freight train can remove the need for 50 long distance lorry, journeys, reducing the demands of the road network and therefore significantly reducing emissions. In the last year, the share of consumer freight transported by rail has increased by 6.5 per cent , representing the seventh consecutive year of growth. Container traffic now accounts for a larger proportion of rail freight. Rail has increased this market share despite a 15 per cent decline in consumer imports into the UK over this period.
- 7.2. Rail is responsible for less than 1 per cent of UK carbon emissions<sup>12</sup>. In general terms it performs well from a carbon efficiency perspective compared to other modes, in particular on busier routes with high passenger and freight loadings. Accommodating ongoing growth in passenger and freight demand to support government's wider economic and social objectives will require, as explained earlier, more and longer trains and all other things being equal, will result in higher carbon emissions. This increase has been predicted by various sources as between 8 and 13 per cent by 2020.
- 7.3. The networks ability to introduce new low carbon technologies rapidly is hampered by the need to maintain the timetable, the sweating of rail assets such as rolling stock and lineside infrastructure. Unlike the road network

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<sup>9</sup> RPI and wages data for 2011 till 2015 - [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/junebudget\\_complete.pdf](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/junebudget_complete.pdf) page 93 - 6.9% based on RPI of 3.9% plus 3% = 6.9%

<sup>10</sup> Source: [statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/lmsuk1010.pdf](http://statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/lmsuk1010.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Chelmsford and Reading feature in the ORR list of the of top 20 stations for commuter ticket entries per annum in 2009/10.

<sup>12</sup> Source:- <http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/scienceresearch/technology/lctis/lowcarbontis?page=9>

trains cannot easily be diverted around disruptions. On some routes the provision of a single track or even single track in each direction can result in some major disruption. Unite believes that for the network to cope with the future demands of our growing population, there needs to be a major programme of track doubling (laying two tracks where there is just one) and redoubling (laying two tracks where there was previously two).

- 7.4. Equally it is no use providing overhead or third rail electrification for the rail freight industry, if the whole route from A to B is not electrified unless you invest in dual mode traction units. To do otherwise would result in an increase in the number of fossil fuel powered trains running under the wires.
- 7.5. As with any transport mode that is reaching capacity, additional capacity is required. As highlighted earlier the rolling stock improvements are very limited. Investment into the provision of more track is the only option open.
- 7.6. The creation of HS2 will provide additional capacity but only in a narrow corridor and not necessarily for the complete duration of the journey. Current plans suggest the addition of new track between London, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester but no additional public transport capacity on the routes leading to or from these terminals. Without the ability to enable better intermodal interchange with other public transport modes, very little capacity will be released on the existing routes.

## **8 Franchise procurement**

- 8.1. Unite believes that the franchisee should accept the full risk throughout the franchise with support only being provided if the service can meet key target criteria or if they can clearly show the need for support due to unforeseeable losses. Unite does not agree that this need increase the cost to the tax payer if the additional funds are provided to franchisees that are well run and not used as cash machines for investors.
- 8.2. Bidders for franchises should provide a No Net Loss/No Net Gain process to map out necessary changes to the relationship but central government should have the final say over what is or is not provided and if necessary (as was the case on the East Coast main line contract) revert to directly provided rail service.
- 8.3. Unite realises that such franchise negotiations may be difficult, but at the end of the day, it is the franchisee who stands to make a profit from providing the service, on behalf of a centrally owned and funded network. If no franchise is interested in the opportunity, then central government should endeavour to provide the service to obtain first hand experience of the difficulties faced. Negotiating away the family silver, does not appear to be the wisest move.
- 8.4. Passenger satisfaction can clearly be measured by a combination of alternative mode availability cost and route utilisation, combined with the levels of punctuality, complaints and value for money.
- 8.5. Unite believe sanctions should be applicable if the network does not meet commitments to invest in workforce training, innovation, qualified punctuality

statistics and ticket price value. The punctuality of services is very often caused by the sweating of the assets and the inability of operators to allow enough room to make up for earlier delays. Some factors caused by accidents caused by outside bodies and suicides extra, which are clearly beyond the reasonable control of the franchisee. However, proper maintenance, signage and station security can reduce the number of these incidents.

- 8.6. Therefore instead of a rigid one size fits all punctuality requirement, there should be provision to produce a differential between announced departure/arrival times and reality in set circumstances. Unite has received reports that suggest franchise holders have manipulated statistics and reduce disruption payments to passengers by cancelling services and claiming that passengers were only delayed by less than thirty minutes as this may be the duration of the delay on the first train out after services are resumed.
- 8.7. Additionally some franchises have delayed reimbursement of tickets affected by disruption, by issuing vouchers which can be utilised only when purchasing a new ticket. This results in the commuter having to store vouchers until the next ticket renewal date, which may be up to a year later. Such a practice provides the franchise with what amounts to an interest free loan at the expense of the travelling public.
- 8.8. Unite strongly believes that where the franchise has failed to deliver the services it has published it should provide refunds to the passenger without the need for the passenger to make a claim every time. Technology exists to track which passenger has entered each station at what time. There is therefore no excuse for the operator not to know who was and who was not affected by disruption.
- 8.9. Equally there needs to be the ability of the franchise operator to reclaim from the maintenance company, network rail or whoever is responsible for the disruption to the service, for its losses, if they were caused by either their actions or inaction. If the franchise operators are responsible for the maintenance of the fleet and they have not had it serviced regularly then they should take the blame.

## 9 **Conclusion**

- 9.1. Unite agrees that it would be beneficial to have an increased duration of franchise, in terms of investment into the network and infrastructure. Unite feels that such franchises should be properly monitored and designed, however, to ensure investment rather than a licence to print money for franchise company shareholders.
- 9.2. Removing limits on ticket prices simply discourages the transition away from other less environmentally friendly modes and stifles economic growth in other sectors that rely on consumer spending.
- 9.3. Unite believes that even after the limitations outlined earlier in this response are in place there is still significant scope for the rail network to make significant profits. If you compare the rail fares structures of other European

nations they appear to be able to provide a far better service at a much reduced cost. Why can't we do this in the UK?

Bob Rixham  
**National Officer – Docks, Railways, Ferries and Waterways**  
Unite the Union  
499 Etruria Road,  
Basford  
Stoke-on-Trent  
ST4 6JR

For further information please contact Colin Potter, Research Officer in the Unite the union Research Department on 020 7611 2591, [colin.potter@unitetheunion.org](mailto:colin.potter@unitetheunion.org)

## Appendix 1 - Percentage of passengers in excess of capacity 2008 and 2009 (Autumn) - London and SE operators

|   | Peak<br>(AM)<br>2009 | Peak<br>(AM)<br>2008 | Peak<br>(PM)<br>2009 | Peak<br>(PM)<br>2008 | Overall<br>2009 | Overall<br>2008 |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|   | PiXC (%)             | PiXC (%)             | PiXC (%)             | PiXC (%)             | PiXC (%)        | PiXC (%)        |
| c2c                                       | 1.5%                 | 2.7%                 | 0.3%                 | 0.4%                 | 1.0%            | 1.6%            |
| Chiltern <sup>A</sup>                     | 2.6%                 | 3.9%                 | 0.7%                 | 0.3%                 | 1.8%            | 2.3%            |
| First Capital Connect <sup>B</sup>        | 0.9%                 | 4.9%                 | 1.2%                 | 3.2%                 | 1.0%            | 4.2%            |
| First Great Western <sup>A</sup>          | 11.4%                | 8.9%                 | 4.4%                 | 3.6%                 | 8.2%            | 6.5%            |
| London Midland <sup>C</sup>               | 3.6%                 | 6.9%                 | 8.1%                 | 2.3%                 | 5.9%            | 4.8%            |
| London Overground <sup>A,D</sup>          | 2.7%                 | 1.4%                 | 0.0%                 | 0.0%                 | 1.6%            | 0.8%            |
| National Express East Anglia <sup>A</sup> | 2.6%                 | 4.8%                 | 0.9%                 | 2.4%                 | 1.8%            | 3.7%            |
| Southeastern <sup>E,r</sup>               | 1.6%                 | 3.0%                 | 0.5%                 | 1.6%                 | 1.1%            | 2.3%            |
| Southern <sup>F,G</sup>                   | 4.2%                 | 4.2%                 | 1.3%                 | 0.8%                 | 3.0%            | 2.7%            |
| South West Trains                         | 2.8%                 | 2.8%                 | 1.8%                 | 1.7%                 | 2.3%            | 2.3%            |
| <b>Total<sup>f</sup></b>                  | <b>2.9%</b>          | <b>4.0%</b>          | <b>1.4%</b>          | <b>1.8%</b>          | <b>2.2%</b>     | <b>3.0%</b>     |

Source: Department for Transport and Transport for London

### Notes

<sup>A</sup> Figures are based on only one manual count per service.

<sup>B</sup> First Capital Connect acquired extra rolling stock to increase capacity during 2009.

<sup>C</sup> Counts were carried out during Autumn 2009 and so do not take into account the additional capacity gained as a result of the December 2009 timetable change.

<sup>D</sup> Counts for two AM peak services were carried out in February 2010.

<sup>E</sup> Counts were carried out before the major timetable change in December 2009 and so the high speed services are not included.

<sup>F</sup> The new Southern franchise commenced in September 2009.

<sup>G</sup> Includes Gatwick Express.

<sup>r</sup> Southeastern have revised their 2009 data, this has also resulted in a change to the 2009 total values.

## Appendix 2 Passenger journeys by ticket type

Great Britain 2002-03 Q1 to 2009-10 Q4 (millions)

|         | Franchised ordinary fares | Franchised season tickets | Total franchised passenger journeys |
|---------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2002-03 | 564                       | 412                       | 976                                 |
| 2003-04 | 561                       | 451                       | 1,012                               |
| 2004-05 | 579                       | 466                       | 1,045                               |
| 2005-06 | 585                       | 498                       | 1,082                               |
| 2006-07 | 618                       | 533                       | 1,151                               |
| 2007-08 | 639                       | 586                       | 1,225                               |
| 2008-09 | 665                       | 609                       | 1,274                               |
| 2009-10 | 685                       | 573                       | 1,258                               |

## Appendix 3 Passenger revenue by sector

Great Britain 2002-03 Q1 to 2009-10 Q4 (£m)

|         | Franchised long-distance operators | Franchised London and SE operators | Franchised regional operators | Total franchised passenger revenue |
|---------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 2002-03 | 1,279                              | 1,848                              | 535                           | 3,663                              |
| 2003-04 | 1,384                              | 1,932                              | 585                           | 3,901                              |
| 2004-05 | 1,465                              | 2,059                              | 634                           | 4,158                              |
| 2005-06 | 1,609                              | 2,197                              | 687                           | 4,493                              |
| 2006-07 | 1,842                              | 2,437                              | 733                           | 5,012                              |
| 2007-08 | 2,036                              | 2,717                              | 801                           | 5,555                              |
| 2008-09 | 2,168                              | 2,963                              | 872                           | 6,004                              |
| 2009-10 | 2,216                              | 3,045                              | 917                           | 6,179                              |

## Appendix 4 Revenue per passenger kilometre and revenue per passenger journey

Great Britain 2002-03 Q1 to 2009-10 Q4

|                | Total franchised passenger kilometres (billions) | Total franchised passenger journeys (millions) | Total franchised passenger revenue (£m) | Revenue per franchised passenger km (pence/km) | Revenue per franchised passenger journey (£/journey) |
|----------------|--|--|---|--|--|
| <b>2002-03</b> | 39.7   | 976  | 3,663                                   | 9.23   | 3.75   |
| <b>2003-04</b> | 40.9   | 1,012  | 3,901                                   | 9.54   | 3.86   |
| <b>2004-05</b> | 41.8   | 1,045  | 4,158                                   | 9.96   | 3.98   |
| <b>2005-06</b> | 43.2   | 1,082  | 4,493                                   | 10.40  | 4.15   |
| <b>2006-07</b> | 46.2   | 1,151  | 5,012                                   | 10.84  | 4.36   |
| <b>2007-08</b> | 49.0   | 1,225  | 5,555                                   | 11.33  | 4.53   |
| <b>2008-09</b> | 50.7   | 1,274  | 6,004                                   | 11.84  | 4.71   |
| <b>2009-10</b> | 51.1   | 1,258  | 6,179                                   | 12.09  | 4.91   |