
Work& Parents competitiveness and choice.DTI consultation on draft regulations flexible working provisions
GMBResponse
GMB welcomes the new right of parents of young anddisabled children to apply to work flexibly and the duty on employers toconsider such requests seriously. Wewelcome the opportunity to comment on these draft regulations, having commentedextensively on earlier consultation processes.We believe that this new right has the potential to deliver realimprovement to the lives of working parents.Furthermore, by providing more flexibility to working parents, weanticipate a knock-on effect as employers become more comfortable with thebenefits of giving more control to all workers over their working patterns.
This paper sets out our response to the consultationquestions, together with comments on the draft regulations.
For further information please contact Matilda Quiney,Research Department.
We were disappointed that the new right will beavailable only to parents with children aged under six or disabled childrenaged under 18. We recommend that thisaspect of the legislation is considered by the review in 2006.
We were also disappointed that the new right islimited to employees. In addition, weare particularly concerned that agency workers are specifically excluded fromthe regulations. This appears to goagainst recent moves in employment law.Although regulation of agency workers is in draft form and subject toEuropean Directive which has not yet been agreed, the status of agency workersmay be clarified shortly in any event. The explanation given in the explanatorynotes to the Employment Rights Act 2002 shut down any possibility that theagency worker could have a good case and the employer might be open to thatcase. The regulations only cover a right to apply for flexible working, soemployers have an adequate defence already in the circumstances outlined in theexplanatory notes.
We also believe that the 12-month lock-out period istoo long. Quarterly cycles are commonfor planning and forecasting, including planning of shift cycles.
The term upbringing is not clear.
Stephenis a carpenter. He split from hisgirlfriend when his son was two and is now moving to a new job with a newpartner 200 miles from where his ex-partner lives. He sought court agreement for his son to live with him, butwithdrew his claim when he realised that his son was upset by the process.
We suggest that the words for the upbringing aredeleted, and that the right is conferred on those with responsibility forcaring for the child.
There may be a drafting error in regulation 3 (b) (ii)- should "living with" be deleted, as otherwise there is a highertest on married partners than non-married partners of parents.
We are pleased to see the emphasis that the rightapplies equally to anyone who has responsibility as a parent of a child.
We strongly support the inclusion of adoptive parents,although we would have liked to see provision for the right to be extended toup to six years following adoption.This should be examined by the review in 2006.
We agree that foster parents should have access to theright, although accept that as the right is a permanent change to contracts itwill be limited in their cases.
Michael a social worker - and Sandra a charity administrator - have been accepted asemergency foster parents. This meansthat they could be called upon for (usually) short term fostering at shortnotice eg if a single parent is hospitalised for few days following anemergency operation; for weekend respite care.They are able to turn down requests to foster because of workcommitments, but in order to make it more likely that they can realise theirambition to foster, Sandra wishes to work part time and Michael wishes to get ageneral agreement to work flexi-time, including building up a bank of time offin lieu which is larger than that currently allowed for under his currentflexitime agreement, to be taken at specific times on agreement with his linemanager. The right to request flexibleworking would provide both with an avenue to explore these alternatives.
In our experience, guidance can sometimes encourageemployers to stick rigidly to minimum entitlements, under the misapprehensionthat they are not allowed to go further.We would press the government to include in its guidance wording tostate that although the law only provides for a permanent change in contracts,it does not preclude a contractual agreement to a temporary period of flexibleworking. Other best practice exampleswould be helpful.
This would enable both parties to trial run the newarrangement and review it at the end of the trial. This would surely have advantages on both sides, not leastencouraging employers to be more open-minded about working arrangements withwhich they are not familiar, and providing them with a defence against indirectsex discrimination claims if the new arrangement did not work out.
We remain concerned that the requirement on theemployee to state the effect on the business and how this might be amelioratedis onerous. Would this advantage anemployee who has no time to look into the matter and states that there is noeffect on the business, as against the employee in the same circumstances whoundertakes research into the possible effects but is not sure how to deal withthem?
We are of the opinion that the application should nothave to be laid down on a statutory form to enable employers to tailor forms indiscussion with employees and their representatives eg to include details offlexible working schemes already available in the workplace, details ofoccupational entitlements to leave, details of the procedure with job titles ofappropriate people involved. But thereshould be an example of a form in the guidance.
We agree that the application should not contain aprompt for the employee to include details of why they are making theirrequest. This has the potential ofinfringing rights to privacy and could lead to unnecessary conflict.
We agree that the application is taken as made onreceipt by the employer, but we think that the employer should be required toacknowledge receipt for clarity.Guidance should also encourage the employer to inform the employee ofany gaps in information in his/her request at this stage.
We would have preferred the statutory approach toenable the tribunal to examine properly the reasons for refusal.
The regulations do not appear to cover the employertelling someone at the meeting that they are not eligible when they are, forexample if they tell the employee that they have only 25 weeks service, whenthey have been employed for 26 weeks.This may be covered by the incorrect facts, provision of new section 80H(1) (b), but we feel that this should be explicit.
We believe that there should not be a limit on aweeks pay. The current limit at 250is very low and enables employers to evade their responsibilities on economicgrounds. We would also like to see nolimits on actual loss, injury to feelings and interest.
The following examples are intended to provide somethoughts on where losses might occur.
Example 1
UnderManinders contract as a nurse in a care home, annual leave accrued duringmaternity leave had to be taken prior to returning to work (ie added to the endof the maternity leave period). Sherequested that on return from maternity leave, her accrued annual leave be carriedover to enable her to return to work paid full time, but working fewer days fora number of weeks. This was because thenursery to which she intended to send her son indicated that it did not have afull time vacancy until a couple of months after her return date.
Had therebeen a delay to the decision because the procedure was not followed, her costsmight have included childcare costs.She could have provided evidence of the daily rate at the nursery.
Analternative is that she would have returned part time for the weeks in questionand lost pay. In other circumstances it is possible to think of parents takingtime off for dependants, or a partner taking annual leave.
In analternative scenario, her request was turned down, but she did not know thisuntil she returned to work, because her employer did not send her thedecision. By this time her mother hadorganised a long trip to India, so the offer of free childcare was gone.
Example 2
Debbiesemployer agreed to her request to work term time only.
Had theprocedure not been followed, Debbie would have continued to use up annualleave. Had she had a firm and timely"no", she would have used time off for dependants during childcarebreakdown, so that she had sufficient annual leave to take a holiday.
Example 3
Natashaworks part time for a clothing company.She recently altered her times of work so that she worked all her hourswithin three days, rather than spread across five days.
In analternative scenario, Natasha turned down an offer of work from anotheremployer while waiting for her request to be considered.
Example 4
Karenworks in an office. Her daughter wasgiven a place at a local authority nursery school which was attached to awell-regarded primary school. In orderto take up the offer, she needed to begin work half an hour later each day, butcould leave later because her partner was able to pick up the child.
A delayin agreeing the new pattern of work meant that she could not confirm the place,and it was lost, along with her deposit, and she had to place her daughter in amore expensive private nursery. And itmade it less likely that her daughter would be accepted at the primary schooltwo years later. We accept that thelatter point is speculative, but it is important to many parents.
In analternative scenario, she was turned down, but because the procedure wasdelayed, she accepted the place in the hope of succeeding her request becauseit was her preferred option for her daughter.When she finally came to realise that her employer had no intention offollowing the procedure, she had to take her daughter out of the nursery afterjust a few days and arrange alternative care in the more expensivenursery. This meant giving threemonth's notice at the first nursery and paying three month's fees.
Example 5
Brianrequested part time work to participate more fully in child-rearing when hiswife returned to work. This involvedco-ordinating his work with that of his partner. When the request was not dealt with in a timely manner, thiscaused problems for both him and his partner.Had he been given a straightforward "no", his partner wouldhave been able to make alternative arrangements. The stress of not knowing had an impact on their home life.
We believe that compensation should be sufficient foremployees to see the new regulations as a real remedy against inflexibleemployers, so that they have less incentive to pursue a sex discrimination casewhere there is no cap.
It should also be noted that there should be toughpenalties for breaching a procedure because the tribunal will not have thepower to order the employer to implement a flexible working arrangement.
We also calculate that the procedure takes aroundthree months. It could easily take a furthernine months, if not longer, before a complaint is heard at IndustrialTribunal. Where additional costs arebeing paid, for this time, we believe that 52 weeks compensation is moreappropriate.
For the above reasons, we believe that the number of weekspay should be at least 52.
Guidance should make clear that adjournments should bealso to an appropriate time and place convenient to both parties.
Employees right to be accompanied
We believe that statute should provide for a rightconsistent with the right to be accompanied at disciplinary and grievancehearings. We believe that it is veryimportant to include a full-time official or lay official as certified by theunion. There may not be a recognisedtrade union or local representative.Colleagues in the workplace (including at times the union workplacerepresentative) may not be sympathetic to the request.
In addition, employees would have less incentive to godown the grievance route if they had the same right to representation.
We do not think it necessary to lay down in law thestatutory ability to be accompanied by a non-industrial outsider such as afriend, relative or indeed expert in flexible working to the initialmeeting. We would be concerned that theemployer might then be prompted to react by arriving mob-handed with thepurpose of intimidation, and including at the meeting for example barristers,or consultants armed with complex legal or business reasons to turn down therequest. But we do see that someoutside experts can be helpful at later stages.
Where the guidance addresses the constructive and opennature of the discussion, it should note that employers can make meetings moreformal than they should be.
We agree that the employers decision need not be instatutory format.
The information given in the table is appropriate,depending on the level of detail, which is not clear in the consultationdocument. We suggest that the statementof the right to appeal should include the time limit.
Extensions of time limits should be agreed inwriting. The relevant regulationsshould be amended to ensure that bothsides are required to sign and date the agreement [Reg 12 (2) (d)].
Careful thought would have to be given to the guidancegiven on a range of examples indicating the appropriate level ofexplanation. We are happy with thelevel of detail given on page 36 of the Act's Explanatory notes.
We were unhappy with the use of the term"staff" at 80 G (1) (b), because many of our members take the term toapply to non-manual as opposed to manual workers. We would have preferred the term "workforce".
The consultation document does not suggest who mighthear an appeal. The regulations shouldrequire appeals to be heard by an appropriate person who is not the same personwho held the original meeting. Theexisting ACAS code should apply and guidance should refer to the mediationservices of ACAS.
We would prefera best practice rather than a statutory appeal form so that it can beadapted.
Extension of time limits
As stated above. extensions of time limits should beagreed in writing and this should be clear in the regulations.
Extensions to enable further enquiries intoimplementation of particular working patterns may be acceptable as long asthese are related to the length of time to undertake the enquiry and not usedto unnecessarily delay procedures. Ifthis is the case, then it will be in the employees best interest to agree anextension. If not, then failure toagree should mean that the extension cannot happen.
We accept theextension due to illness or annual leave, but feel that this should not beautomatic and should be limited. Largeremployers are likely to have arrangements for cover for periods of illness orannual leave longer than a few days and where there is adequate cover, absenceshould not be a reason to delay. Wherethere is no cover, there should be a time limit on the extension.
When an application may be treated as withdrawn
We believe thatapplication withdrawals should be required in writing.
Failure toattend two meetings should certainly not be taken as withdrawal where theemployee has had to take for example time off for dependants or sick leave atshort notice.
We would alsobe concerned at the unreasonable refusal to provide required information to theemployer. The employer appears to be inthe position of being able to decide what is an unreasonable refusal, yet ableto require unreasonable information which could be of a personal andinappropriate nature. Having receivedinsufficient information, the employer can always refuse the request and givethat as a reason, so does not need the double protection of being able to deemthe request withdrawn. We suggest thatregulation 16 (c) is deleted.
Publicity
Finally, webelieve that the new regulations must be widely publicised usingparent-friendly methods alongside traditional routes, eg childcare providers,healthcare providers, community and parents groups and libraries.