Ministers attacked for Iraq WMD response

A committee of senior MPs and peers has slammed the government's response to a previous report on its intelligence assessment of the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

In its annual report, parliament's intelligence and security committee (ISC) attacked the "extremely unsatisfactory" response of ministers to a previous report on Iraqi intelligence.

The September 2003 report examined key issues about whether the available intelligence was properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in government publications.

A government response was published in February 2003 following the Hutton inquiry into the suicide of weapons expert Dr David Kelly.

"The committee is not satisfied with the government’s response," said the ISC report.

"It emphasised only four key conclusions while either rejecting or failing to address fully many of our other conclusions and recommendations.

"We regard this as extremely unsatisfactory and we recommend that the government explicitly address each of our recommendations and conclusions in future responses.

"Our dissatisfaction was increased by the government's decision to allow such little time for parliamentary debate on two such significant reports."

Missing documents

The committee said in its September 2003 report that it had seen all the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments relating to Iraqi WMD from August 1990 to September 2002 and that the JIC produced eight assessments on Iraqi-related matters during the period October 2002 to March 2003.

But this was now revealed to be untrue, with some documents not passed to the MPs and peers at the time of their investigation.

The report revealed that in May this year the committee was given a further eight JIC papers relating to Iraqi WMD and UN inspections that dated from these periods, which a subsequent check had revealed had not been provided last year.

"This causes us considerable concern," said the report.

However, the new documents "would not have led us to change the conclusions, including those that were critical, in our report".

"We have received an apology and we accept that there was no deliberate attempt to withhold information from us," the committee said.

"However, we are concerned that some internal systems and record-keeping within the Cabinet Office's Intelligence and Security Secretariat are defective and we will return to this issue."

Iraq abuses

The fallout within the intelligence community to the war in Iraq also dominates much of the report.

It says that military commanders in the field during the war felt well served by the intelligence they received.

But it also highlights key issues likely to embarrass ministers.

The prime minister wrote to the committee informing them that UK intelligence officials had been witness to one case of abuse of an Iraqi detainee.

In the published version of the report, key passages have been replaced by "***" to keep the details confidential.

"Interviews of detainees conducted or observed by UK intelligence personnel have, with the following exception, been conducted in a manner consistent with the principles laid down in the Geneva Convention," Tony Blair wrote.

"In June 2003, two *** interviewed an Iraqi detainee *** at ***. The detainee was brought in hooded and shackled by the US military, and remained so during the one-hour interview.

"The *** understood these measures to be for security purposes, and did not report it at the time since they were not then aware that hooding was unacceptable.

"The detainee showed no signs of distress and made no complaint of being hooded or otherwise during the interview."

The committee's report also also revealed that "on the few occasions" when UK officials became aware that detainees were being treated inappropriately the concerns "were passed on to the US authorities".

"We will take evidence on all these matters and the usefulness of information obtained from interviews," added the report.

Objections to the war

It was also revealed that a total of three members of staff at GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) had objected to working on the Iraq conflict.

They were "moved to other work either at their own request or as the result of a management decision".

"We have been told that the staff members and the agencies were content with these arrangements," said the report.

On the arrest of former GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun, the committee said it was satisfied that the discontinuance of her trial had not been related to the attorney general's advice on the lawfulness of invading Iraq.

It was also revealed that MI6 had an undisclosed budget underspend partly caused by "the fact that it has not been able to operate as freely in Iraq as estimated".

Secret finances

The cross-party ISC, which is chaired by Labour MP and former chief whip Ann Taylor, describes itself as operating within "the ring of secrecy".

"The committee sees significant amounts of classified material in carrying out its duties and it takes evidence from Cabinet ministers and senior officials – all of which is used to formulate its reports," says its latest report.

Witnesses over the current year included foreign secretary Jack Straw, home secretary David Blunkett, defence secretary Geoff Hoon, transport secretary Alistair Darling and attorney general Lord Goldsmith.

Also giving evidence on the funding of the intelligence agencies was the Treasury's chief secretary, Paul Boateng.

The report said that the intelligence resource budget had risen from £908.9 million in 2001/02 to a planned £1.16 billion by 2005/06.

But individual breakdowns for GCHQ, MI5 ad MI6 were removed from the published version of the report.

The higher spending is expected to deliver a "step change" in capability, which the MPs and peers said was "overdue".

With the next spending review set to be announced, the committee also expressed concern at the public service agreements (PSAs) that are entered into with the Treasury in return for extra cash.

"We believe that some of the targets are comparatively meaningless and that the JIC requirements and priorities are more useful to the allocation of resources," said the report.

There is also concern that MI5 is "not going to be able" to meet some existing PSA targets.

And with an "overall reduction in the agencies' resources" for countering serious organised crime, the committee noted that "support has not been provided to the extent that the committee or the home secretary had hoped".

Mystery section

One further issue relating to MI5 about which the committee expresses "concern" is missing from the report.

"We have been told that ***," says the report.

"***. We are concerned that ***

"***

"***

"***

"***

"***. We will return to this matter."