It was President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela who said "Heads of State go from Summit to Summit, while many of their people go from abyss to abyss". Will this WSSD, now nearly 18 months old, be any different?
It would be churlish to call the agreed Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI) worthless, as some have stated, when there are over 30 targets in the agreed text, though many of these are restatements of existing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Significant new developments include halving the number of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015, new measures to regulate toxic chemicals by 2008, a cautious commitment to restore fish stocks 'where possible' by 2015, an 'aim' to achieve a 'significant reduction' in the current rate of species loss by 2010, moves to improve developing country access to alternatives to ozone-depleting substances, and some progress in establishing a stronger benefit-sharing regime for Southern countries under the Convention on Biological Diversity in respect of biopatenting.
This is not an unimpressive list, but the huge drawback is that the Johannesburg text says very little about how these aims will be realised or who will be responsible for achieving them. And without new funding commitments and clarity on responsibilities, it is difficult to see how the necessary programmes of action can be put in place. To illustrate the enormity of some of these commitments, simply to meet the target to bring basic sanitation to the 2.5 bn people on this planet who currently lack it would require piped connections to 200,000 households per day till 2015.
At the heart of the JPOI is the tension between grand design and the management of detailed programmes on the ground. In the preparatory stages a new 'Global Deal' was mooted between North and South, which would tackle the unfinished business from UNCED by recognising mutual responsibility for action between countries in achieving common goals and commitments. In the event, however, the US, with tacit support from a handful of countries including Australia and Japan, effectively exerted a veto on the wishes of others to initiate an ambitious attempt to bring together relevant international policy activities under the umbrella of sustainable development. The US thus removed the overarching notion of a deal which could challenge existing power structures and 'business as usual', and focussed the agenda instead on isolated delivery mechanisms - 'solutions on the ground' principally involving the private sector. So far from adopting a mandate for radical reappraisal of the purposes and functions of international institutions, this piecemeal US approach implied that the fundamentals are sound and only minor adjustments are necessary.
Indeed the US influence went further. By strongly advocating Type 2 Partnerships between government, private sector and civil society action, but essentially dominated by large private companies, the US line implied that inter-governmental negotiations and commitments were scarcely important or necessary at all. However, this was resisted by most governments, notably the EU and South Africa, which insisted that Type 2 Partnerships should not supplant Type 1. In an effort to carry this through, the WSSD Bureau issued an explanatory note which proposed that Type 2 Partnerships should share ownership between partners, be new initiatives which demonstrate added value in terms of Agenda 21 and the MDGs, have specific targets and timeframes for their achievement, and have a system of accountability for monitoring progress. This was helpful, but did not evade the central dilemma as to whether official recognition of such partnerships strengthened inter-governmental commitments or marginalised them.
There were other arguments too against the Type 2 approach. One was that it involved a new form of conditionality through which donor countries could force recipient countries to accept multi-national companies as providers of basic utilities by linking funding to a Type 2 package. Another fear was that Type 2 projects would reduce pressure on donor countries to provide additional direct financial support for sustainable development in the South. Indeed the UN Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development gave substance to these fears. The EU kept to its current practice in the tying of aid, placing questionable obligations on recipient countries, while the US insisted on tying its aid to political, legal and economic reform.
So what has happened? Type 2 partnerships have indeed continued to be contentious. There is resistance because in the absence of inter-government decision-making it is feared that 'coalitions of the willing' involving major companies will take control which are less accountable to the needs and wishes of the world's poorest people, for example in the provision of water and energy. There is fear that the term 'partnership' masks a whole range of power imbalances which will fatally undermine principles of transparency, accountability, equality and sustainability.
To be fair, others see it differently. The World Resources Institute - hardly a corporate front organisation - has seen it as a shift from the stiff formal waltz of traditional diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisational solution-oriented partnerships that may involve NGOs, willing governments, and business. The test of course is: do they work? Over 220 partnerships, with $235m in resources, were identified in advance of WSSD, and about 60 partnerships were announced during the Summit. Do they really make a difference, increasing the amount of available resources rather than merely diverting funds from other sources? Do they enhance accountability or smother it? And can they be assessed independently and credibly, and where appropriate criticised as ineffective, or as window-dressing, or even as counter-productive? And if so, is there leverage to change them?
Part of the answer lies in the subtle change in the NGO focus over the last decade. NGO participation at UNCED was predominantly from the environmental movement, while at WSSD they were spread around organisations representing issues of equity and human rights, land ownership, development, corporate accountability, and social justice. As a result it proved difficult to present consensus NGO positions along the lines of the Alternative Treaties negotiated by NGOs at Rio.
A more worrying problem is the context of WSSD, where it can be seen that the Summit was too isolated from the general thrust of global social and economic development. Many of the position statements agreed during the Summit focussed on the work of the WTO, World Bank, IMF, and the EU's CAP, but without drawing them into the process so as to mainstream sustainable development. In reverse, as a result of US pressure, the WSSD found itself at risk of being colonised by the private sector agencies used as the motive force for change by these other UN institutions. This was accentuated at CSD 11 in April-May 2003 which agreed a work programme for the next decade, but failed to tackle the central power issues. UN system coherence on sustainable development issues was not addressed. Trade and sustainable development, particularly relations with the WTO, were ignored. Corporate accountability was not embodied in the CSD's future agenda, despite its prominence in WSSD. Conflict and militarization were not invoked, despite the situation in the Middle East. And the growing significance of World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategies in shaping donor relations with least developed countries was not really considered, although these are seen by many development agencies as much more important than country strategies for sustainable development.
So will it work? WSSD has been called the last of the mega-summits, the 'last in a great cycle of global conferences', from Rio through the Millennium Summit, the Monterrey conference on development financing, and key trade rounds including Doha. From now on the emphasis will be on monitoring and reporting on commitments already made, and the naming and shaming of those who do not act. An enormously ambitious work programme has been agreed at the last CSD, involving successive 2-year work cycles covering water, energy, agriculture, transport, forests and oceans, through to 2015.
This is a huge vision, but it will hinge on resolving 5 key requirements - the overall management of the total project, financing, the quality of organisation on the ground, the mainstreaming of other major related institutions, and accountability to local communities. It is far too soon to reach a judgement on these counts, but I do think there are grounds for scepticism and concern on each of them.
On overall management, the project will be led by UNDP and CSD. I have to say, in respect of CSD, that a global forum of politicians, civil servants and NGOs must be one of the worst arenas in which to get to grips with the challenge of putting the JPOI into action. The global management challenge is frankly colossal, and requires organisational innovation and genius. CSD on the other hand is a discussant forum, not an action organisation, and whether it can shift to the very different role required I frankly doubt.
On funding, Monterrey was a surprising success, with $11 bn new money being put on the table by the US and EU. But there is still too little agreement on objectives, too much conditionality, too little untying of aid, and too little consultation of local communities about priorities and logistics.
Organisation on the ground remains uncertain because so little action has so far been taken. But there is little evidence yet of necessary infrastructure being put in place in key locations.
Mainstreaming both with other key UN economic bodies and with Type 2 private sector partners remains absolutely essential if sustainable development is to take root everywhere. But this requires keeping up constant unrelenting pressure on unwilling, sceptical and sometimes hostile partners, and the UN bureaucracy might be regarded as the last place in the world for ideological proselytizing.
Finally, the whole enterprise will not work without accountability to local communities. It is no use the UN merely conducting technocratic or bureaucratic assessments of challenges to be confronted. It has to find means by which the poor and deprived can obtain redress from those with power in securing the fundamental improvements in their life that they crave.
It is not that these things cannot be done. They can. What is lacking is the political will. The poor watch and wait to see whether hunger, disease and global warming will be tackled with the same vigour, financial disregard as to cost, and relentless determination as was so recently displayed by some on the military front.
