I shall try not to use all the time available to me, not least because clause 7 was dealt with magnificently by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson), and clause 10 was dealt with similarly by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), who I thought was at her compelling and frightening best. Those clauses are the two iniquities in the Bill. When it is written in a Bill that children are at risk of impoverishment, that is a matter warranting the utmost scrutiny, demanding the utmost answer.

The answer that we received from the Minister today was very simple. She said that the solution lay in the hands of parents. They had the option of returning whence they came or had been sent, and we would throw in some money to help them. The responsibility was theirs.

Let me echo what was said by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner). It is deplorable that parents should use their children to obtain benefit or advantage. That happens in this country, among our indigenous population, thousands if not hundreds of thousands of times each day. It is, however, infinitely more deplorable that the state should attempt to use children to deny that benefit or advantage, however illegal it may be. The Minister's response that she is sure - profoundly sure - that parents faced with that alternative will go back, no matter what the consequences may be, simply underlines the power of the threat without attempting to explain away the threat itself.

Let me now turn to the part of the Bill on which I have concentrated during the debate - clause 10, which deals with the removal of judicial oversight, judicial review, the Court of Appeal or any form of judicial counterweight to the tribunal that we are setting up. Judicial review is an ancient right that goes back to the Star Chamber. No tribunal in the country is free from judicial review. If we pass the Bill in its present form, we will pass a measure that - in peacetime - will have been without compare for centuries.

It is worth reflecting on precisely what that means. It means that the tribunal, once established, can make any decision, however unreasonable, even if it is so unreasonable that no tribunal could previously have arrived at it. The decision may be capricious, but it will be immutable and without challenge. The tribunal will be able to act entirely outside the powers that we in Parliament have given it, and that too will be immutable and without challenge. That is the extent of the Bill that we are being asked to pass, and it is entirely unique.

The other aspect, which has already been touched on, is the effect of the appeal process on tribunals. If I may, I shall draw from my own limited experience. I have sat as a temporary judge since 1982, and I can say without hesitation that it concentrates the mind wonderfully to know that one's decisions, whatever they are, will be the subject of judicial review. But in this case, the only review will be that by the tribunal itself. The tribunal will have the capacity to look again at its decision, but that is not an appeal process. If I were asked to review a decision that I had taken, I would have a natural proclivity to think that it was probably right, particularly if I knew that there was no appeal against it. That is the extent of the power that we are giving to such tribunals.

It is interesting to reflect that no tribunal in this country is free from judicial review. If a planning tribunal that is deciding whether a conservatory may be put up acts unreasonably or outside its powers, it is subject to judicial review. Here, we are talking about a tribunal that can decide whether a person is liable to torture or death, yet its decision will not be the subject of any review.

We must be careful where we travel in this regard. Recent history's examples of repressive or oppressive regimes have hallmarks that can be traced through them. The first is the identification of unpopular, minority or weak groups. The second is the vilification of those groups as being unworthy and undeserving. The third is the removal from those groups, and only those groups, of the protection and rights that they enjoy under the law. The fourth is the blaming of those groups themselves for the removal of those rights, and, often, the vilification of the civil liberties organisations that attempt to protect them.

So as we embark on this road, it is worth reflecting - as I hope the Home Secretary will - that we are entering dangerous territory and a realm in which we have bad friends. I hope that he will reflect that if we put into effect measures that give the appearance of a repressive and oppressive state, we are but a short step away from becoming a repressive and oppressive state. For my part, I do not accept in any way the apologia that by imposing these strictures and eroding these civil liberties, we will in some way head off the extreme right by taking its ground and distilling away its support. I do not believe that for one minute; nor is there any historical context in which that has proved the truth. The fact is that moving down that road offers the extreme right encouragement and support, and, ultimately, success.

Of course, this is not a statistical matter - it is the principle that is all-important - but it is worth reflecting that in 2002, the judicial review process threw back 260 cases as being not simply wrong, but so wrong that they were wholly and completely unsupportable. It is reasonable to suppose that if half those cases involved families, 200 to 300 children were involved in those decisions. Those are the people who will now have no right of appeal. They will face the agonising choice of going into impoverishment and care or going back to the country in which they were persecuted. For those reasons, it will be a pleasure for me to support the reasoned amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson). I very much hope that many of my hon. Friends and other hon. Members will be able to do likewise.